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COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO 
SUBPART J OF THE 1994 NATIONAL 
CONTINGENCY PLAN 
Meghan Gavin 
 
ABSTRACT: The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP) provides the organizational structure and procedures 
for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous 
substances. Subpart J of the NCP governs the use of chemical agents to control 
oil discharges, setting forth the criteria for listing an agent on the Product 
Schedule—a list of the dispersants and other spill-mitigating substances that 
responders may use in carrying out the NCP. Dispersants are chemical agents 
that emulsify and disperse oil into the water column. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) last amended Subpart J in September 1994. 
In light of research and lessons learned during and after the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon underwater oil well blowout, the EPA proposed amendments to Subpart 
J in January 2015. Responders used a combined methodology consisting of 
containment and recovery techniques, in-situ burning, and chemical dispersant 
application to lessen the environmental impact of the Deepwater Horizon event. 
Responders applied nearly two million total gallons of dispersants at the surface 
and subsea, a controversial and unprecedented decision. When choosing this 
methodology, responders weighed the potential benefits of intervention against 
possible collateral harms. But with an outdated contingency plan and Product 
Schedule, responders lacked data that could have helped to inform their risk 
analysis. The EPA’s proposed amendments address this concern. 
This Paper comments on the satisfactoriness of the EPA’s 2015 proposed 
amendments for the following sections of Subpart J: section 300.915, which 
details data and information requirements for listing on the Product Schedule, 
focusing on the proposed efficacy and toxicity testing methodologies; proposed 
section 300.950, newly limiting the submission of claims of confidential business 
information; proposed section 300.970, providing grounds for the removal of a 
dispersant from the Product Schedule; and section 300.910, which governs the 
authorization of an agent for use during a spill response. Furthermore, this 
Comment recommends that, in order to uphold the NCP’s command to apply a 
response methodology most consistent with protecting the environment and 
public health, the EPA should formalize a two-phase response plan into Subpart 
J, thereby only permitting the use of dispersants after an informed weighing of 
the tradeoffs indicates that containment and recovery techniques alone cannot 
satisfy this mandate. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The truth is, nobody really knows what to expect, so you 
have to be prepared . . ..People make too many decisions based 
on incomplete information. You need to do your homework.”1 
1. Martine Costello, A Recession-proof Business, CNNMONEY (Nov. 3, 1998, 9:31 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/1998/11/03/smbusiness/q_smallbiz_downturn (quoting Paul 
Hense). 
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Mr. Hense, a member of the White House Council on Small 
Business, spoke these words in 1998 to urge small business 
owners to prepare for the economic downturn, but they ring 
just as true for those preparing for a Spill of National 
Significance,2 such as the Deepwater Horizon event.3 The 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan, otherwise known as the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP), coordinates oil spill preparation and response.4 In order 
to best serve those choosing amongst response technologies, 
the NCP must provide responders, particularly the Regional 
Response Teams (RRTs), Area Committees (ACs), and On-
Scene Coordinator (OSC) with complete and relevant 
information. 
As required by sections 311(d) and 311(j) of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), amended by section 4201 of the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA), the President must prepare and publish a 
national response plan in case of an oil spill or hazardous 
substance release.5 This plan must include a list—the Product 
Schedule—of the chemical dispersants or other spill-mitigating 
substances, if any, that responders may use in carrying out the 
plan.6 Dispersants are “chemical agents that emulsify, 
disperse, or solubilize oil into the water column or promote the 
surface spreading of oil slicks to facilitate dispersal of the oil 
into the water column.”7 Through Executive Order 12777, the 
President delegated this authority to prepare and publish a 
national contingency plan to the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA or Agency).8 
2. See generally U.S.C.G., COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 16465.6 (2012), 
https://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/16000-16999/CI_16465_6.pdf (providing guidance to 
the U.S. Coast Guard for designating an oil spill as a Spill of National Significance 
under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan). 
3. See U.S. EPA OIG, NO. 11-P-0534, REVISIONS NEEDED TO NATIONAL CONTINGENCY 
PLAN BASED ON DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, 1, ii (2011), http://www.epa. 
gov/oig/reports/2011/20110825-11-P-0534.pdf [hereinafter Revisions Needed]. 
4. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(d)(2)(G), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2) 
(2014); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 
40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000). 
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2). 
6. See id. § 1321(d)(2)(G); see, e.g., U.S. EPA, NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 
PRODUCT SCHEDULE (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/ 
documents/schedule.pdf (providing the most recent Product Schedule as an example). 
7. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5. 
8. See Exec. Order No. 12777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54757 (Oct. 22, 1991). 
 
                                               
3
Gavin: Comments on Proposed Revisions to Subpart J of the 1994 National
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
180 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:1 
The EPA last amended Subpart J of the NCP in 1994 to 
govern the use of oil spill and hazardous substance release 
response technologies.9 In addition to setting forth the 
circumstances for the use of dispersants and other chemical 
agents, Subpart J outlines twelve criteria manufacturers must 
satisfy for their chemical agents to be listed on the Product 
Schedule. The Regional Response Team (RRT), Area 
Committee (AC), and On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) permit a 
Responsible Party (RP) to choose from these listed agents 
when responding to an oil spill or hazardous substance 
release.10 
On January 22, 2015,11 the EPA proposed changes to 
Subpart J of the NCP, addressing concerns raised during the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon underwater oil well blowout—one of 
the worst environmental disasters in the history of the United 
States.12 After the Macondo well exploded 5,000 feet below the 
surface in the Gulf of Mexico, responders used a combined 
methodology consisting of containment and recovery 
techniques, in-situ burning, and chemical dispersant 
application to lessen the spill’s environmental impact.13 
Each of these three response tools presents advantages and 
disadvantages. Containment and recovery techniques slow the 
spread of spilled oil and remove it from the water. It rarely 
results in the recovery of more than ten percent of spilled oil 
however.14 In-situ burning causes the oil to combust at the 
surface, but it exposes on-scene responders to respiratory 
health risks.15 Dispersant application, whether at the surface 
or subsea, does not reduce the total volume of oil in the 
environment. Rather, it changes the oil’s chemical and physical 
9. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920. 
10. See id. §§ 300.910-.920. 
11. The comment period closed on April 22, 2015. No final rule was issued before 
this article’s publishing. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 3379 (proposed Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 300.900-.920) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. 
12. See id.; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, The Macondo Blowout 
Environmental Report, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management 1, 7 (2011), 
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/DHSGWorkingPapersFeb16-2011/Macondo 
BlowoutEnvironmentalReport-TA_DHSG-Jan2011.pdf. 
13. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 2. 
14. See id.; see also Charles W. Schmidt, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: 
Dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico, 118 ENVTL HEALTH PERSP. 338, 340 (2010). 
15. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 4. 
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properties, emulsifying it into droplets roughly ten microns in 
size.16 These droplets become entrained in the water column 
where they eventually undergo various natural removal 
processes; most commonly, marine bacteria metabolize the 
oil.17 In the meantime, dispersants expose a greater expanse of 
the marine environment—the water column—to oil, and when 
trapped underwater, oil’s lighter, more volatile components, 
including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene, cannot 
evaporate.18 Once settled in the anoxic and nutrient-limited 
seafloor sediments, dispersed oil can persist for years, causing 
chronic biological exposures that can reduce organisms’ 
productive and reproductive output, which can, in turn, 
prevent an exposed population from recovering fully for 
decades.19 This Comment focuses on dispersant application, 
the most controversial oil spill response and the technique 
with the least understood consequences.20 
When choosing which response actions to accept and which 
to reject, the RRT, along with the AC or OSC, must weigh the 
potential benefits of intervention against possible collateral 
harms.21 Under this “risk-based paradigm,” a term coined by 
the Deepwater Horizon Study Group, the benefits of using 
chemical dispersants include shoreline protection, surface oil 
volume reduction, and accelerated microbial decomposition 
through oil emulsification and the resultant increase in surface 
area.22 On the other hand, the likely harms include facilitation 
16. See id. at 3; see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. 
17. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 2; see also Schmidt, supra 
note 14, at 340. 
18. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 2. 
19. See Charles H. Peterson et al., A Tale of Two Spills: Novel Science and Policy 
Implications of an Emerging New Oil Spill Model, 62 BIOSCIENCE 461, 461 (2012) 
(discussing, within the context of the Deepwater Horizon event, the need to modify 
laws and policies designed to protect ocean resources in order to accommodate deep oil 
drilling). 
20. See generally John M. Cunningham et al., Use of Dispersants in US: Perception 
or Reality?, 1991 INT’L OIL SPILL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 389, 392 (1991), 
http://ioscproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-1991-1-389 (examining recent 
U.S. oil spills in which responders evaluated whether or not to use dispersants, which 
are controversial). 
21. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 463. 
22. See id. at 464; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 3; 
Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. Members of the Center for Catastrophic Risk 
Management at the University of California, Berkeley, formed the Deepwater Horizon 
Study Group. 
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of oil transport from the surface to the seafloor, increased 
exposure of oil to subsurface marine life, infiltration into the 
food chain and biomagnification (as zooplankton can mistake 
dispersed oil droplets in the water column for food), 
widespread mortality of pelagic and benthic organisms, 
creation of larger dispersed oil plumes of uncertain fate and 
environmental impact, addition of more toxins to the sea, and 
elimination of any possibility for recovery of the dispersed oil.23 
Deepwater Horizon responders faced a spill of 
unprecedented magnitude and depth for which they lacked 
relevant data to create a well-informed response plan.24 
Responders needed accurate information about the ecological 
and health impacts of prolonged dispersant use.25 The EPA, 
though, had not amended the NCP in the sixteen years prior, 
failing to require improved dispersant efficacy and toxicity 
testing protocols.26 Much of the data that could have helped 
the RRT, AC, and OSC to evaluate the ecological harms caused 
by their chosen methodology still remain unknown. For 
example, the rate at which chemically dispersed oil binds to 
sediments, how quickly it breaks down, how undersea 
organisms ingest it and take it up, what by-products result 
when microbes degrade it, and whether the combination of a 
dispersant and oil may be more toxic to marine life than oil 
alone all remain unknown.27 Responders also lacked, and still 
lack, information about potentially adverse health effects 
caused by dispersant use,28 because it is difficult to separate 
the symptoms of oil exposure from those associated with 
23. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 464; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 
supra note 12, at 3; Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. 
24. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 462; see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. 
25. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. 
26. See generally National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.901. (1994). 
27.  See generally Roberto Rico-Martinez et al., Synergistic toxicity of Macondo crude 
oil and dispersant Corexit 9500A® to the Brachionis plicatilis species complex 
(Rotifera), 173 ENVTL. POLLUTION 5 (2013) (finding that when oil mixes with Corexit 
9500A®, toxicity to B. manjavacas increases up to 52-fold, thus suggesting the toxicity 
from Corexit application was underestimated in the case of the Deepwater Horizon 
event); see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 341. 
28.  See generally Gina M. Solomon, MD, MPH & Sarah Janssen, MD, PhD, MPH, 
Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1118 (2010) (using the 
Deepwater Horizon event to discuss the direct threats to human health from 
inhalation or dermal contact with oil and dispersant chemicals and the indirect threats 
to seafood safety and mental health). 
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dispersant exposure.29 Responders did know, however, that 
dispersant exposure might enable oil to more easily penetrate 
the skin.30 
Despite these unknowns, when evaluating the known trade-
offs, the OSC—the United States Coast Guard in this instance 
(the Federal On Scene Coordinator or FOSC)—decided to 
include dispersant application in the early stages of the 
response plan.31 Responders applied approximately one million 
gallons of dispersants to surface slicks and approximately 
three quarters of a million gallons, for the first time, subsea.32 
This use of dispersants raised many questions about the 
sufficiency of the information Subpart J requires the RRT, AC, 
and OSC to receive.33 
To address this concern, the proposed revisions to Subpart J 
include new dispersant testing and listing requirements. 
Specifically, the EPA proposes to “[r]evise the efficacy testing 
methodology using a baffled flask test [(BFT)], establish new 
developmental and sub-chronic toxicity testing requirements, 
revise the acute toxicity testing methodologies, revise the 
listing criteria, and establish use limitations to saltwater 
environments.”34 This Paper comments on the reasonableness 
of the EPA’s proposed amendments and, moreover, suggests 
that, in light of the NCP’s mandate in Subpart D to apply a 
response methodology “most consistent with protecting public 
health and welfare and the environment,”35 responders should 
authorize the use of dispersants only as a last resort, at least 
until the effects of dispersants are better understood. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE NCP PRODUCT SCHEDULE 
The NCP establishes national response capabilities and 
promotes coordination among a hierarchy of responders and 
contingency plans for oil spills and hazardous substance 
29. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 342. 
30. See id. at 324-25. 
31. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4, 8. 
32. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381. 
33. See generally Revisions Needed, supra note 3 (commenting on the need for new 
testing procedures and response protocols in light of the Deepwater Horizon event). 
34. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381. 
35. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 
300.310(b) (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)). 
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releases.36 Either the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
or the EPA has modified the NCP in keeping with 
environmental disasters and legislative advancements. 
In 1968, the oil tanker Torrey Canyon spilled more than 
thirty-seven million gallons of crude oil off the coast of 
England.37 To prevent similar environmental damage from 
affecting the waters of the United States and to avoid 
repeating the operational mistakes that had occurred in 
England, the CEQ published the National Oil and Hazardous 
Materials Pollution Contingency Plan shortly thereafter.38 
This 1970 plan established a comprehensive system of spill 
containment and cleanup practices, favoring mechanical and 
other physical control measures over chemical technologies.39 
It permitted the use of dispersants only when other methods 
were deemed inadequate or infeasible and requirements for 
listing on the Product Schedule had been met.40 The Product 
Schedule, Annex X–Schedule of Dispersants and other 
Chemicals to Treat Oil Spills, restricted dispersants from use 
in certain waters, such as those where the winds or currents 
would likely bring the dispersed oil mixtures to shorelines 
within twenty-four hours or those with major populations of 
fish or marine species.41 
The CEQ renamed the plan the National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan in 1971 and made 
other minor changes in 1972.42 
The CEQ revised the NCP in 1973 as a result of the newly 
crafted Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, more 
36. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(d)(2)(G), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2) 
(2014); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.901. 
37. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) 
Overview, U.S. EPA (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/national 
-oil-and-hazardous-substances-pollution-contingency-plan-ncp-overview [hereinafter 
Overview]. 
38. Id.; See National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan, 35 
Fed. Reg. 8508 (finalized June 2, 1970). 
39. See 35 Fed. Reg. 8508. 
40. See id. 
41. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3382. 
42. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 16215 (1971); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, 36 Fed. Reg. 18411 (1972); National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan, 37 Fed. Reg. 28208 (1972). 
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commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).43 Through 
Annex X, the CEQ, while still advocating the use of mechanical 
and other control measures, increased its tolerance of the use 
of dispersants.44 
In 1975, the CEQ continued to advocate “the development 
and utilization of mechanical control methods to remove or 
mitigate oil,” while providing procedures for authorization of 
the use of dispersants or other chemical agents in Annex X.45 
For listing on the Product Schedule, a dispersant 
manufacturer needed to submit the dispersant’s shelf life, 
toxicity, and effectiveness.46 
In response to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, the EPA 
amended the NCP in 1982.47 Annex X became Subpart H of the 
revised NCP.48 Subpart H granted OSCs the ability to 
authorize the use of listed dispersants to treat oil spills.49 The 
EPA Administrator then gained the authority to permit the 
use of non-listed dispersants.50 
The EPA amended Subpart H in 1984.51 One change 
increased the OSC’s authority, permitting the OSC to 
authorize the use of any product, including chemical agents 
not on the Schedule, when the OSC concluded that a product’s 
use was necessary to prevent or substantially reduce hazard to 
human life.52 The EPA also updated the testing and data 
requirements for listing on the Product Schedule and created a 
disclaimer, announcing that the listing of a product on the 
Schedule served as a confirmation that the listing criteria had 
43. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d). (1972); see 
also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 38 Fed. Reg. 
21887 (1973). 
44. See 38 Fed. Reg. 21887; see Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3382. 
45. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 
1510 (1975) (regarding 40 Fed. Reg. 6282 (1975)). 
46. See id. 
47. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 
C.F.R. § 300 (1982) (regarding 47 Fed. Reg. 31180); see also Overview, supra note 37. 
48. See 40 C.F.R. § 300; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3383. 
49. See 40 C.F.R. § 300. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. (regarding 49 Fed. Reg. 29192 (1984)). 
52. See id. 
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been met, not as a recommendation for the use of that 
product.53 
Responding to the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA), the EPA made minor changes to 
the NCP in 1990, reformulating Subpart H as Subpart J–Use 
of Dispersants and Other Chemicals.54 
Most recently, prompted by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA), the EPA revised the NCP in 1994.55 “The final rule 
significantly revised Subpart J to current regulatory 
requirements with respect to authorization of use, data 
requirements, dispersant effectiveness and toxicity testing 
protocols, [etc.].”56 For the last twenty-one years, the EPA has 
not proposed any amendments to the NCP, until recently, 
when it partially responded to “the political and social 
nullification of the NCP [that took place] during the Deepwater 
Horizon response” by suggesting modifications to Subpart J.57 
III.  THE CURRENT RULE: SUBPART J OF THE 1994 NCP 
By design, listing on the Product Schedule and the judgment 
of the RRT, AC, OSC, and RP determine which dispersants, if 
any, will be used to combat an oil spill.58 
A.  The EPA Sets Forth Twelve Criteria in Subpart J that a 
Submitter Must Complete in Order for the EPA to List a 
Dispersant on the Product Schedule 
Subpart J details twelve requirements for listing on the 
Product Schedule: providing the dispersant name, brand, or 
trademark, if any; manufacturer, importer, or vendor contact 
information; distributor contact information; shelf life; 
handling and worker precautions for storage and field 
53. See id. 
54. See C.F.R. § 300 (1990) (regarding 55 FR 8666 (1990)); see also National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920 (1994), 
amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)). 
55. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920. 
56. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3383. 
57. See U.S.C.G., NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER’S REPORT: MC252 DEEPWATER 
HORIZON, 1, 4 (2010), http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachments 
ByTitle/SA-1065NICReport (emphasis in original) [hereinafter INCIDENT REPORT]; see 
also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11. 
58. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.910-915. 
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application; recommended application procedures, 
concentrations, and conditions; concentrations and upper 
limits of heavy metals, cyanide, and chlorinated hydrocarbons; 
contact information and qualifications of the testing 
laboratory; documentation of adherence to the 1991 or 1992 
Annual Books of American Society for Testing and Materials 
standards; effectiveness results; toxicity results; and the 
chemical agent components.59 The EPA will list any product 
whose submission packet meets these criteria, only reviewing a 
submission for completeness and not independently confirming 
test results.60 
The last three criteria—providing a dispersant’s efficacy, 
toxicity, and chemical components—are especially 
controversial and also important for the RRT and AC or OSC 
to know during the risk evaluation. Therefore, this Comment 
discusses these three criteria further here. 
1.  1994 Effectiveness Testing 
Under the 1994 NCP, effectiveness testing requires a 
dispersant manufacturer to perform a Swirling Flask Test 
(SFT).61 For listing, a dispersant needs to attain an average 
effectiveness value of only forty-five percent (dispersing forty-
five percent of the oil) when mixed with only two types of oil—
Prudhoe Bay Crude and South Louisiana Crude—and 
saltwater at room temperature (twenty to twenty-three 
degrees Celsius).62 
2.  1994 Toxicity Testing 
Toxicity testing requires a dispersant manufacturer to 
determine the product’s acute (short-term) toxicity by exposing 
the product to only two saltwater species, the inland silverside 
fish (Menidia beryllina) and the mysid shrimp (Americamysis 
bahia).63 Manufacturers expose these two species to five 
concentrations of the product and also to one type of oil (No. 2 
59. See id. § 300.915(a)(1)-(12). 
60. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 3; see also Cunningham, supra note 29, at 
390. 
61. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(7). 
62. See id. § 300 app. C. 
63. See id. § 300.915(a)(8) app. C. 
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Fuel Oil), alone and in a 1:10 mixture of product to oil, for 
ninety-six hours and forty-eight hours, respectively.64 At the 
end of this exposure period, a manufacturer calculates the 
concentration of product causing fifty percent lethality (LC50) 
to the two test organisms and reports this number to the 
EPA.65 
3.  1994 Confidential Business Information 
Subpart J asks a manufacturer to “[i]temize by chemical 
name and percentage by weight each component of the total 
formulation”;66 however, manufacturers may assert claims of 
confidential business information (CBI), refusing to make this 
information public.67 “Typically, manufacturers claim as CBI 
the chemical identity (e.g., chemical name and chemical 
abstracts number [CAS]) and concentration (weight percent) of 
each chemical component in the product along with 
information about the concentrations of those components in 
the product . . ..”68 
B.  The OSC, RRT, and AC Determine Whether Responders 
Will Apply Dispersants During an Oil Spill Response 
Through Subpart J of the 1994 NCP, the EPA welcomes the 
use of dispersants as an oil spill control measure.69 Subpart J 
encourages RRTs and ACs to develop preauthorization plans, 
authorizing the use of certain listed dispersants in advance of 
an oil spill.70 For spill situations not addressed by a 
preauthorization plan, Subpart J permits the OSC to authorize 
the use of listed dispersants or other chemical agents on an oil 
discharge.71 The OSC may also authorize the use of any 
dispersant or other chemical agent not listed on the Product 
Schedule without obtaining concurrences from the EPA 
representative to the RRT or from the affected states’ 
64. See id. § 300 app. C. 
65. See id. 
66. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(10). 
67. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3413. 
68. See id. 
69. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.910. 
70. See id. § 300.910(a). 
71. See id. § 300.910(b). 
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representatives to the RRT if the OSC judges that the use of 
the product is necessary to prevent or substantially reduce a 
hazard to human life.72 
The OSC, in coordination with the RRT and AC, will 
authorize the chosen response protocol, deciding between 
mechanical collection, in-situ burning, dispersant or other 
chemical agent application, or a combination of methods.73 
According to the EPA Office of Inspector General, “[t]he 
decision to use dispersants involves tradeoffs between 
decreasing risks to water surface and shoreline habitats, and 
increasing potential risks to organisms in the water column 
and on the sea floor.”74 If the RRT and AC or OSC authorize(s) 
the use of dispersants on an oil spill, practical considerations, 
such as product availability, weather conditions, oil type, and 
the discharge situation will influence which specific product 
the RP applies.75 
IV.  DISPERSANT APPLICATION DURING THE 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
On April 20, 2010, ignited gases from API Well No. 60–817–
44169 (the Macondo well) caused the Deepwater Horizon 
mobile offshore drilling unit, owned and managed by 
Transocean and contracted by BP p.l.c., to explode and catch 
fire forty-two miles off the coast of Louisiana.76 An estimated 
four million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico over 
the next eighty-seven days, until BP sealed the Macondo well 
on July 15, 2010.77 Response technologies included 
containment and recovery methods, such as the use of 
absorbent booms, skimmers, and oil-water separators; in-situ 
burning; and the application of chemical dispersants.78 
72. See id. § 300.910(d). 
73. See id. § 300.910; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3384. 
74. Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 3. 
75. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3395. 
76. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4; see also Deepwater Horizon Study 
Group, supra note 12, at 2; Schmidt, supra note 14, at 339. 
77. See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2015 WL 225421, at *22 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2015) (finding four 
million barrels of oil released from the reservoir in the Gulf of Mexico during the 
Deepwater Horizon event); see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 
2. 
78. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 7-8. 
 
                                               
13
Gavin: Comments on Proposed Revisions to Subpart J of the 1994 National
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
190 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:1 
The FOSC ordered responders to apply dispersants at the 
surface two days after the explosion and directly at the 
wellhead—an unprecedented decision—eight days after that.79 
“Approximately one million gallons of dispersants over a three 
month period were deployed on surface slicks over thousands 
of square miles of the Gulf, and approximately three quarters 
of a million gallons of dispersants were, for the first time, 
injected directly into the oil gushing from the well riser.”80 
Responders used Corexit EC9527A® and then Corexit 
EC9500A® when stockpiles of the first diminished.81 The 
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Corexit EC9527A, 
which was listed on the Product Schedule in 1978, indicates 
that it contains the solvent 2-butoxyethanol, which may cause 
skin or gastrointestinal irritation, hemolysis, or kidney or liver 
damage.82 Corexit EC9500A, which was listed on the Product 
Schedule in 1994, contains petroleum distillates akin to 
kerosene instead of 2-butoxyethanol.83 Both products used 
organic sulfonic acid salt for the surfactant and propylene 
glycol as the stabilizer.84 The Product Schedule indicated that 
Corexit EC9527A had efficacy results averaging 50.4 percent, 
and Corexit EC9500A’s averaged results equaled fifty 
percent.85 Corexit EC9527A®’s toxicity results showed that it 
had a LC50 of 14.57 parts per million (ppm) for Menidia 
beryllina and 24.14 for Americamysis bahia. When mixed with 
No. 2 Fuel Oil, the toxicity levels lowered to 4.49 ppm for 
Menidia beryllina and 6.60 ppm for Americamysis bahia.86 
Corexit EC9500A presented with a LC50 toxicity to Menidia 
beryllina of 25.20 ppm and 32.23 ppm to Americamysis bahia. 
When mixed with No. 2 Fuel Oil, the toxicity to Menidia 
beryllina was 2.61 ppm and 3.40 ppm to Americamysis bahia.87 
79. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4; see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. 
80. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381. 
81. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4, 8. 
82. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 342; see also BP, Regional Oil Spill Response Plan 
019560 (2009), http://housedocs.house.gov/energycommerce./Docs_06152010/BP.Oil. 
Spill.Response.Plan.pdf. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 8. 
86. See Emergency Response: Corexit EC9527A, U.S. EPA (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/corexitr-ec9527a. 
87. See Emergency Response: Corexit EC9500A, U.S. EPA (Dec. 31, 2014), 
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Practical considerations influenced the decision to use the 
Corexit products specifically. The Region 6 preauthorization 
plan was out of date at the time of the spill, as the RRT and 
AC had not updated it to reflect deepwater drilling trends or 
lessons learned during a 2002 Spill of National Significance 
exercise.88 The preauthorization plan also lacked stringency 
and specificity, allowing the OSC to authorize the use of any 
dispersant listed on the Product Schedule that the OSC 
considered appropriate.89 The EPA and the FOSC therefore 
placed the decision in BP’s hands, requiring it, as the RP, to 
identify an appropriate dispersant.90 BP requested to use the 
Corexit product, for which its Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill 
Plan expressed a preference.91 After conducting additional 
toxicity testing,92 and in response to concerns, the EPA and the 
FOSC shortly thereafter issued a second addendum to a Joint 
Directive, requiring BP to select and apply a less toxic but 
equally effective product within twenty-four hours.93 BP 
responded that Corexit was the only product available in 
sufficient quantities within the imposed twenty-four hour 
window, so a change in product did not take place.94 
V.  PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO NCP SUBPART J 
In keeping with the Schedule’s history of modification after 
an environmental disaster, the EPA proposed amendments to 
Subpart J of the NCP in order to incorporate lessons learned 
from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response.95 The EPA 
seeks to redefine dispersants as “typically mixtures of solvents, 
http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/corexitr-ec9500a. 
88. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 14. 
89. See REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM VI, FOSC DISPERSANT PRE-APPROVAL 
GUIDELINES AND CHECKLIST 1 (2001), http://www.glo.texas.gov/ost/spill-response-
resources/rrtvi/rrt6.pdf. 
90. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 13. 
91. See BP, supra note 82, at 019560. 
92.  See Kilduff, infra note 147, at 394. In August, after BP capped the Macondo 
well, the EPA conducted a second round of toxicity testing. See U.S. EPA OIG, supra 
note 3, at 5. 
93.  See U.S. EPA, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE add. 2 
(May 20, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/directive-
addendum2.pdf. 
94. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 13. 
95. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381. 
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surfactants, and additives that promote the formation of small 
droplets of oil in the water column by reducing the oil-water 
interfacial tension” and to make other changes affecting a 
product’s eligibility for listing and authorization of use.96 
This Paper comments on the Agency’s proposals for the 
following revised sections of Subpart J: section 300.915, which 
details data and information requirements for listing on the 
Product Schedule, focusing here on efficacy and toxicity 
testing; proposed section 300.950, newly limiting the 
submission of CBI claims; proposed section 300.970, which 
newly provides grounds for the removal of a product from the 
Schedule; and section 300.910, addressing the authorization of 
an agent for use in response to a spill.97 
A.  The EPA’s Proposed Requirements for Listing Under 
Section 300.915 May Still Not Provide the OSC, RRT, and 
AC with Sufficient Information 
In proposed section 300.915, the EPA seeks to increase the 
criteria for listing outlined in Subpart J from twelve to twenty-
one.98 While the EPA’s amendments modernize the efficacy 
and toxicity testing protocols, the EPA could still strengthen 
these listing criteria so as to provide responders with the best 
information possible when weighing the environmental and 
health tradeoffs associated with the application of dispersants. 
1.  2015 Effectiveness Testing 
In its January 2015 proposed amendments, the EPA 
suggests changing the effectiveness testing method.99 First, the 
96. Id. at 3422. 
97. See id. at 3422-3427. 
98. See id. at 3424-25 (regarding section 300.915). One of these proposals—the 
requirement that manufacturers provide the estimated annual dispersant production 
volume, the average and maximum daily production volumes, and the timeframe 
needed to meet that maximum volume—will help to ensure responders do not sacrifice 
environmental and health concerns as a result of production limitations. See id. at 
3425; see generally Response to Corrective Action Plan for OIG Report No. 11-P-0534, 
Revisions Needed to National Contingency Plan Based on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 
August 25, 2011, U.S. EPA OIG (2012), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/11-P-
0534_IG_Comment_on_Response_(OSWER-2nd).pdf (acknowledging in memorandum 
form U.S. EPA OSWER’s recommendations for amending the NCP in light of the 
Deepwater Horizon event) [hereinafter Response to Corrective Action Plan]. 
99. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3403. 
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EPA proposes switching from the SFT to the BFT.100 Second, 
the EPA proposes that manufacturers use Alaska North Slope 
and Intermediate Fuel Oil as the test oils instead of Prudhoe 
Bay Crude and South Louisiana Crude.101 Third, the Agency 
suggests that a manufacturer must test the product’s 
effectiveness at two temperatures, five degrees Celsius and 
twenty-five degrees Celsius, to reflect surface and subsea 
temperatures.102 Fourth, the EPA proposes increasing the 
efficacy value required for listing such that a dispersant would 
need to demonstrate that the lower ninety-five percent 
confidence level (LCL95) of six replicate flasks meets the 
following criteria: at five degrees Celsius, a product must 
disperse at least seventy percent of Alaska North Slope and at 
least fifty-five percent of Intermediate Fuel Oil and at twenty-
five degrees Celsius, a product must disperse at least seventy-
five percent of Alaska North Slope and least sixty-five percent 
of Intermediate Fuel Oil.103 If a dispersant could not 
demonstrate for each oil and temperature at the LCL95 
effectiveness values greater than or equal to these percentages, 
the EPA would not list the product on the Schedule.104 
Addressing these proposals in turn, first, the change from 
the SFT to the BFT is overdue. The EPA discovered over a 
decade ago that the SFT was susceptible to human error and 
identified the BFT—a more reproducible testing procedure—as 
“the most appropriate efficacy testing protocol.”105 The EPA 
should also develop an action plan for more quickly 
incorporating future scientific advancements into the NCP and 
regional preauthorization plans.106 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 3425 (regarding section 300.915). 
105.  Competing priorities and changes in management, however, prevented the 
EPA from revising Subpart J to reflect this scientific understanding before the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 8;.see also Albert D. 
Venosa & Edith Holder, Laboratory–Scale Testing of Dispersant Effectiveness of 20 
Oils Using the Baffled Flask Test, U.S. EPA 1, 1 (2011), http://www.bsee.gov/ 
Technology-and-Research/Oil-Spill-Response-Research/Reports/600-699/666AA/ 
(supporting the superiority of the BFT). 
106. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 11. 
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Second, while Alaska North Slope and Intermediate Fuel Oil 
represent a wider range of characteristics than the current test 
oils, the RRT and AC or OSC should mandate that the RP 
must test the efficacy of the particular dispersant it has 
identified for use on a spill with regards to the specific oil 
spilled before authorizing its use. Otherwise, the efficacy 
testing results have only a general meaning from which 
responders must extrapolate when assessing potential harms. 
Third, by requiring testing at both surface and subsea 
temperatures, the efficacy testing data provided to the RRT 
and AC or OSC will be more informative. Prior to authorizing 
the use of a particular dispersant, however, at the time of the 
spill, the RRT and AC or OSC should require the RP to test 
some dispersants’ efficacy under actual field conditions, 
including using accurate saline, nutrient load, and 
temperature measurements, in order to determine the most 
effective product for that spill. 
Further, the EPA should require a manufacturer to test a 
product’s efficacy in shallow or shoreline waters, which are 
often less saline. The initial Schedule disallowed the use of 
dispersants along shorelines or in waters less than one 
hundred feet deep, “except when used to prevent or 
substantially reduce the hazard to human life or limb.”107 But 
here, where the EPA leaves open the potentiality for the 
authorization of the use of dispersants in shallow or shoreline 
waters, prior testing should at least reflect those conditions so 
that the RRT, AC, and OSC may properly understand the 
trade-offs at issue. 
Fourth, the EPA should provide greater justification for why 
it will accept an efficacy of only fifty-five percent for 
Intermediate Fuel Oil at five degrees Celsius. This threshold 
value, lower than the others the EPA proposes, represents an 
increase of only ten percentage points from the threshold value 
required by the 1994 Subpart J. 
107. National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 8508 (1970). 
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2.  2015 Toxicity Testing 
The EPA also recommends revising the dispersant toxicity 
testing procedure.108 First, the EPA proposes amending 
Subpart J to require submitters to use Alaska North Slope and 
Intermediate Fuel Oil as the test oils for acute toxicity testing, 
instead of the currently used No. 2 Fuel Oil.109 The test species 
will continue to be Menidia beryllina and Americamysis 
bahia.110 Second, the EPA proposes to conduct the oil-only 
acute toxicity test for the two test oils, rather than requiring 
the dispersant submitters to provide this data. Third, the EPA 
suggests implementing a threshold for the lethal 
concentration: the lower bound of the LC50 ninety-five percent 
confidence interval greater than or equal to ten ppm.111 Under 
this scheme, “LC50 values ranging from 10 ppm to 100 ppm are 
classified as slightly toxic[,] and above 100 ppm[,] substances 
are considered acutely nontoxic to aquatic organisms.”112 
Fourth, the EPA proposes to require both a sea urchin 
development assay to assess the adverse effects of a dispersant 
product on the development processes of fish and invertebrates 
and a sub-chronic assay performed on Menidia beryllina and 
Americamysis bahia for seven days to estimate chronic 
toxicity.113 Both of these tests would also have assigned 
threshold values.114 
Again taking these proposals in turn, first, the EPA 
reasonably switches to Alaska North Slope and Intermediate 
Fuel Oil because these oils exhibit a wider range of 
characteristics than No. 2 Fuel Oil.115 This change would also 
make the toxicity testing procedure congruous with the 
dispersant testing procedure.116 As stated earlier, however, the 
EPA should mandate that the RP test the toxicity of dispersant 
it has identified for use on a spill with regards to the specific 
108. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3404. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 3425 (regarding section 300.915). 
111. See id. at 3404-05. 
112. See id. at 3405. 
113.  See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3405. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. at 3404. 
116. See id. at 3403-04. 
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oil spilled and under realistic conditions before the RRT and 
AC or OSC authorize that dispersant’s use. Otherwise, the 
toxicity testing results have little meaning to the responder 
weighing the potential harms of use versus non-use.117 
Similarly, instead of requiring a dispersant product’s 
toxicity to be evaluated with regards to only two saltwater 
species, the EPA should consider requiring testing against 
more species. The Agency could mandate that before 
authorization of a dispersant occurs, the RP must test that 
dispersant on geographically and ecologically representative 
species, including pelagic and benthic species affected by 
subsea dispersant application, because LC50 values for 
dispersants and dispersed oil-water mixtures vary widely 
among different species.118 The EPA could also consider 
requiring RPs to evaluate a product’s toxicity to metabolizing 
bacteria and ecologically or economically important species of 
concern.119 
Second, the EPA’s decision to conduct the oil-only acute 
toxicity tests itself and to publish the results intends to reduce 
manufacturers’ testing costs.120 Unless one of these two oils is 
spilled, however, this oil-only information will not provide 
much use to the public or response teams. Also, having the 
Agency conduct the oil-only tests may create a missed 
opportunity for detecting anomalies in manufacturers’ 
submitted data.121 Instead, before authorizing the shipment or 
production of oil in waters of the United States, the NCP could 
require the owner of the oil to test that oil’s toxicity on 
organisms representative of the ecosystems through which the 
oil will pass. This way, when a spill occurs, responders will 
117. See generally Response to Corrective Action Plan, supra note 98 (responding to 
the U.S. EPA OSWER’s recommendations to improve the NCP). 
118. Schmidt, supra note 14, at 343. The EPA expresses concern with placing the 
costs of developing and performing these tests on the dispersant manufacturer instead 
of the end-user, but the manufacturer can compensate for these additional costs by 
raising the sale price. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3406. 
119.  See Petition for Rulemaking Under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1321(d)(2)(G) and the Administrative Procedures Act Title 5. Sec. 553(e) to Amend 
National Contingency Plan (NCP) Product Schedule (November 14, 2014), 
http://www.rikiott.com/dispersants/peoples-petition-to-ban-dispersants/ 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
120. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3406. 
121. See id. at 3405. 
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have accurate and timely oil-only toxicity information for use 
in the risk/benefit assessment. 
Third, the EPA provides a rational explanation for its 
suggested threshold values.122 It recommends the lower bound 
of the confidence interval (CI), recognizing the following: 
[T]he CI should not contain any values less than or 
equal to 10 ppm since theoretically, the LC50 can fall 
anywhere within the CI. By using the lower CI, the 
Agency [provides] a conservative decision criterion 
for acute toxicity, and by proposing a greater than 
or equal to 10 ppm threshold level, it [establishes] 
an adequate safety margin without being overly 
restrictive.123 
Fourth, based on the critical need identified during the 
Deepwater Horizon event to understand potential adverse 
developmental and long-term effects of oil dispersants on fish 
and invertebrate species,124 the EPA reasonably adds 
embryogenesis and sub-chronic assays to the listing criteria. 
Rather than exposing test species to sustained concentrations, 
in order to better mimic the effects of tidal cycles, the EPA 
should consider requiring “spiked/declining” chronic exposure 
tests.125 Also, although the EPA suggests testing the 
dispersant alone and the dispersant mixed with each of the 
two test oils when determining acute toxicity, the EPA only 
suggests testing the dispersant alone when determining 
developmental toxicity and sub-chronic effects. The Agency 
should explain why a manufacturer need not perform these 
tests on the mixed solution of dispersant and saltwater, 
especially when literature suggests the combination may be 
more lethal than either alone.126 
Lastly, the CWA, as amended by the OPA, dictates that the 
NCP must include a Product Schedule that identifies the 
quantities of dispersant product that can be used safely in 
waters of the United States.127 Under section 300.910(a)(1), 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 343. 
126.  See generally Rico-Martinez, supra note 27 (suggesting based on research that 
Corexit combined with oil increases the toxicity). 
127. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(d)(2)(G), 33 U.S.C. § 
1321(d)(2)(G)(iii) (2014). 
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preauthorization plans must limit the quantity of product that 
responders can apply to spilled oil.128 Because no such 
requirement exists when a preauthorization plan is not in 
place, in keeping with CWA, the EPA should add another 
criterion to section 300.915, requiring manufacturers to 
suggest a safe quantity of product that responders can apply to 
a given area over a certain period of time.129 
B.  The EPA’s Newly Proposed Section 300.950 Limits CBI 
Claims for the Public’s Benefit 
Recognizing after the Deepwater Horizon event that the 
public has a right to know about chemicals discharged into the 
environment, the EPA proposes limitations to a 
manufacturer’s ability to make a CBI claim in its submission 
package.130 Under section 300.950 of the Agency’s proposed 
amendments, a manufacturer may only claim concentrations of 
chemical components, microbiological cultures, enzymes, or 
nutrients; otherwise, the EPA will not list the dispersant on 
the Product Schedule.131 The Agency will make all other 
information public.132 
Because certain chemicals are more toxic to the environment 
than others, the EPA could consider identifying certain 
chemical components for which the public has a right to know 
the concentrations, rather than allowing manufacturers to 
avoid detailing the concentrations of every chemical used. This 
trade-off would provide the public with greater information 
while still enabling manufacturers to protect their trade 
secrets. 
128. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3422 (regarding section 300.910). 
129. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G)(iii); see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3424 
(regarding section 300.915). 
130. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3413. 
131. See id. at 3413, 3426 (regarding section 300.950). 
132. See id. 
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C.  Under Newly Proposed Section 300.970, the EPA 
Strengthens the Relevance of the Product Schedule by 
Providing for the Removal of Dispersants 
The EPA proposes adding a section for removing products 
from the Schedule, section 300.970.133 This proposed section 
identifies the following examples as causes for removal: 
misleading or inaccurate statements regarding the composition 
or use of the product to remove or control oil discharges, 
alterations to the product without proper notification, failure 
to publish the disclaimer that the EPA does not endorse the 
product, or the discovery of information concerning potentially 
adverse effects of the product to human health or the 
environment.134 The proposed section does not limit the EPA to 
these causes, provided the Agency notifies the manufacturer of 
its reasons for removing the product and allows for an 
appeal.135 
The EPA should also consider adding a provision explicitly 
permitting the public to petition for the removal of dispersants 
despite any time restrictions.136 For example, if a product fails 
to perform in the field, or creates greater health risks to 
humans or the environment than anticipated, removal from 
the Product Schedule may eventually be proper.137 
D.  The EPA Clarifies the Requirements for Authorizing an 
Agent for Use in Response to a Spill Under Section 
300.910 But Could Make This Section Stricter 
The EPA suggests amending section 300.910, which details 
the requirements for the authorization of a product for use on 
an oil spill.138 Specifically, the EPA seeks to revise paragraphs 
133. See id. at 3427 (regarding section 300.970). 
134.  See id. at 3416. 
135.  See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3427 (regarding section 300.970). 
136. See generally Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics et al. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency et 
al. and American Petroleum Inst., 943 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2013), appeal dismissed, 
No. 13-5209, 2014 WL 2178666 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2014) (holding petitioners’ 
allegations that the EPA has failed to meet its requirements under the Clean Water 
Act with regards to Subpart J of the NCP time-barred in light of jurisdictional 
requirement 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). 
137. See Petition, supra note 119. 
138. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3422 (regarding section 300.910). 
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(a) through (f) and to add paragraphs (g), (h), and (i).139 Many 
of these proposed changes clarify the intent of the 1994 
Subpart J,140 but a few substantive changes warrant 
discussion here. 
For example, the EPA proposes to remove the qualifier 
“when developing preauthorization plans” from section 
300.910(f) (section 300.910(g) in the proposed January 2015 
version), thereby clarifying that RRTs have the authority to 
require supplementary efficacy and toxicity testing at any 
time.141 This provision, though clearer, is still discretionary. 
The EPA should instead consider requiring RRTs and ACs to 
order supplementary testing before the OSC authorizes a RP 
to use a particular dispersant, unless relevant, incident-
specific data already exists. 
The Agency also proposes to mandate that RRTs and/or ACs 
must review, and revise as needed, preauthorization plans at 
least every five years or after a major spill.142 This review 
requirement “intends to ensure that preauthorization plans 
are actively maintained and updated to reflect revisions to the 
Schedule.”143 In light of the political delay that kept the 
Agency from requiring the BFT prior to the Deepwater 
Horizon event, the EPA should consider adding “major 
technological or scientific advancements for oil recovery or 
dispersion” as another prong triggering the review/revision 
requirement. 
Lastly, section 300.910(e) of the 1994 Subpart J prohibits 
the use of sinking agents.144 Proposed section 300.910(e), on 
the other hand, crafts an exception, permitting the use of 
sinking agents when the OSC judges it necessary.145 This 
change begs the question whether dispersants applied subsea 
have the same effect as sinking agents, and if so, whether their 
subsea use is proper without the requirement that responders 
139. See id. at 3387. 
140. See id. at 3387-89. 
141. Id. at 3393. 
142. See id. at 3423 (regarding section 300.910). 
143. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3389. 
144. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 
C.F.R. § 300.910(e) (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000). 
145. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3423 (regarding section 300.910). 
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first exhaust all other options for recovery.146 Because the 
international petroleum industry has directed its marine 
exploration and oil production activities to deep (i.e., greater 
than 305 meters) and ultra-deep (i.e., greater than 500 meters) 
fields in the Gulf of Mexico,147 urgency exists to ensure that 
the NCP properly accounts for these deep-drilling activities 
that will likely require a subsea response.148 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Subpart D of the NCP, which the January 2015 proposed 
amendments would leave intact, explains the operational 
procedures for removing oil.149 It announces that response 
actions may include, but are not limited to, source and spread 
control or salvage operations, placement of physical barriers to 
deter the spread of the oil, and the use of chemicals and other 
materials in accordance with Subpart J.150 It commands that 
“[o]f the numerous chemical or physical methods that may be 
used, the chosen methods shall be the most consistent with 
protecting public health and welfare and the environment.”151 
The EPA should therefore consider adding a provision to 
Subpart J that states a preference for containment and 
recovery technologies over in-situ burning and chemical 
dispersant application.152 These physical technologies remove 
oil, do not increase toxicity, and do not prolong the exposure of 
crude oil to the marine environment,153 whereas in-situ 
burning exposes responders to grave health risks,154 and 
146.  See Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez, Dispersants: The Lesser of Two Evils 
or a Cure Worse than the Disease?, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 375, 393 (2011); see also 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 3 (citing Joye, S. B. et al., Soot and 
Slime: Burning and Microbial Metabolism Altered and Transported Macondo Oil from 
the Sea Surface to the Seafloor. (forthcoming)). 
147. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 462. 
148. See id. 
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.310(a). 
150. See id. 
151. Id. 
152. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 
supra note 12, at 3. 
153. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 3, 8. 
154. See id. at 3-4. 
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dispersed oil has the potential to threaten oceanic ecosystems 
for years.155 
Accordingly, similar to the original (1970) NCP, the EPA 
should consider setting forth a two-phased response protocol in 
Subpart J.156 The Deepwater Horizon Study Group suggests 
that during the first stage of oil recovery, responders should 
use containment booms to capture the spilled oil and skimmers 
and absorbent booms to recover it.157 If reached, the second 
stage should begin only after an informed weighing of the 
tradeoffs—based on data obtained from tests using the spilled 
oil type and under representative conditions. This indicates 
responders cannot protect the public health and welfare and 
the environment without the use of alternative technologies, 
such as when the spilled oil presents an imminent threat to 
shoreline ecosystems.158 Only once responders reach this 
consensus should they add the technologies of in-situ burning 
and chemical dispersant application.159 
 
155. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 344. 
156. See National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 8508 (1970); see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9. 
157. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9. 
158. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 
C.F.R. § 300.910(a) (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)); see also Deepwater 
Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9; see also Incident Report, supra note 57, at 
17. 
159. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9; see also Incident 
Report, supra note 57, at 17. 
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